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VIRGIL H. CAMP I 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
Plaintiff-Appellant,. 
vs. 
DESERET MUTUAL BENEFIT 
ASSOCIATION, et al. , 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Civil No. 15,672 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sued to obtain judgment that a certain van was 
"medical equipment" under an insurance certificate provided by 
the defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
At the trial, the matter was submitted on certain agreed 
evidence and the court, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, gave judg-
~nt for defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek an order affirming the judgment below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff's teenage son, Jeff Camp, suffered a neck injury 
in 1976 while jumping on a trampoline. As a result of the injury, 
Jeff is now paralyzed completely up to the level of the nerves from 
the sixth or seventh cervical vertebrae, which means that he has 
no voluntary control of his legs or torso and that his arms and 
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shoulders are disabled, although some function remains. As a 
dependent of the plaintiff, Jeff had health insurance under a cert-
ificate of insurance issued by Deseret Mutual Benefit Association 
by virtue of the plaintiff's employment as an insurance agent 
associated with Beneficial Life Insurance Co. The certificate of 
insurance under which Jeff was covered provided benefits in relevant 
part as follows: 
TYPE II BENEFITS 
Benefits are payable for expenses incurred by you or your 
dependent resulting from bodily injury or sickness on the 
basis of 80% of usual, reasonable and customary charges 
for: 
6. MEDICAL SUPPLIES &~D EQUIPMENT--charges for medical 
supplies and medical equipment prescribed by a physician 
including oxygen; blood and other fluids to be injected into 
the circulatory system; artificial limbs and eyes; casts, 
splints, trusses, braces, orthopedic shoes, crutches, surgical. 
dressings; and rental of special medical equipment recommended 
by a physician such as a wheelchair, hospital type bed, iron 
lung or oxygen equipment. 
7. AMBULANCE--charges for room and board incurred while 
confined in an Extended Care Facility, provided such confine-
ment is for treatment of an acute illness or injury, commences 
within five days after discharge from a hospital and such 
confinement is recommended by a physician for purposes of 
convalescing from such bodily injury or sickness. Custodial 
care is ineligible for benefit. 
12. TRANSPORTATION--charges for necessary transportation 
by railroad or regularly scheduled airline to and from the . 
nearest facility equipped to furnish necessary medical treatmen. 
not otherwise obtainable. [Insurance certificate, Exhibit A 
to the complaint, at 14-16, R 20-21] 
The term 11 custodial care 11 , mentioned in subpart 8 of the above exce~: 
from the certificate, is defined on page 51 of the insurance cert-
ificate as follows: 
-2-
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·n: 
< 
The term custodial care as used in this booklet means main~ 
tenance of a pat~ent beyond the acute phase of injury or 
sickness. [R-38] 
After the accident, Jeff spent about a month at Cottonwood 
Hospital and then was transferred to University Medical Center, where 
lhe stayed from late July, 1976, until his discharge on October 15, 
1976. While at the University Medical Center, Jeff was under the 
care of a rehabilitative medicine team, including Dr. Pedro Escobar, 
I 
I 
his attending physician, a specialist in rehabilitative medicine; 
J~ Woolsey, a social worker; and others, including a psychologist, 
a physical therapist, and other doctors. 
Some time prior to Jeff's discharge, plaintiff asked Woolsey, 
the social worker, and other members of the team about the care of 
Jeff which would be necessary when Jeff went home. A member of 
the team suggested that Dr. Escobar might recommend a specially-
equipped van, to enable Jeff to travel about. Woolsey advised the 
plaintiff, however, that the expense of purchasing such a van would 
·probably not be reimbursed by plaintiff's health insurance. The 
' following ensued : 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
(By Mr. Bushnell) It may be repetitious, but 
go ahead, answer. 
(By Mr. Woolsey) Okay, that I was not sure 
if the insurance company would cover the 
purchase of a van and equipment. 
What did he [Mr. Camp] say to that? 
Well as I recall, he said, I think, that 
they; the insurance company, if they are not 
covering this kind of thing that.they ought 
to and I would like to purchase ~t, to see. 
Fine. And you are the one that put in 
Deseret Mutual where it says "Agency to be billed? 
-3-
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A. Right. 
Q. You did that even though you weren't sure 
whether it was covered or not? 
A. True. 
Q. Why did you have these reservations in your 
mind as whether they would approve it or not? 
A. Well because from experience here on 
rehabilitation, insurance companies, other 
insurance companies have not, you know, 
covered a vehicle, purchase of a car or a van 
for a patient. The only agencies that have 
done anything in that regard are the State 
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation who 
purchased some adaptive equipment for the 
patient, such as hand controls for the 
hydraulic lift, if the patient is a 
quadriplegic and they are approached as a 
last resort for financial help to get these 
things. 
Q. Do you know of any instances where an 
insurance company has in fact approved and 
purchased a motor vehicle itself? 
A. Not with my experience here, I haven't. 
[Woolsey deposition at 17-19.] 
Later, when Jeff's discharge from the hospital was near, 
plaintiff prepared a form of letter for the signature of Dr. 
Escobar, recommending certain equipment for Jeff. The purposeo: 
this letter was to support an insurance claim for the equipment 
plaintiff and his family would need to care for Jeff: 
Q. [Mr. Bushnell] Is it fair, based on what 
you've said, to say then that you initiated 
the precise, specific request to the doctor 
for a letter prescribing the van so you could 
present it to the insurance company? 
-4-
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A. [Mr. Camp] Prescribing all the equipment, the 
answer is yes. 
Q. Including the van? 
A. Including the van. [Deposition of Camp at 18.] 
In response to plaintiff's request, Dr. Escobar wrote a letter, 
dated October 11, 1977, in which he lists the equipment which-
[W]ill be absolutely essential in order for 
Jeff to function as independently as 
possible. 
1. A van equipped with power steering .•• and an 
automatic wheel chair lift. 
2. A standard wheelchair 
3. An automatic hospital bed ••• 
4. A large tire commode chair ••• 
5. A bath shelf 
(Exhibit D-1, deposition of Escobar) 
Plaintiff later filed his claim with DMBA and was reimbursed for 
all of the items mentioned in Dr. Escobar's letter, except for 
the specially equipped van, with respect to which the company 
denied his claim. Thereafter, plaintiff filed this suit. 
Defendants took the depositions of Camp, Woolsey and 
Escobar during the pendency of this action. Dr. Escobar 
testified that there was no medical necessity for the van; he 
stated that: 
Q. [Mr. Bushnell] It is true that the van is 
not for medication or for treatment of any 
physical condition of the plaintiff? 
A. [Dr. Escobar] Yes, sir. 
-5-
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Q. It is just what it purports to be--
transportation. 
A. To the hospital, to school. 
Q. It is not like braces, and other things that 
you have to have with reference to bodily 
function; it is for transportation? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have emphasized, however, that having the 
availability of a van does serve the 
emotional needs of the patient? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You don't expect the van to be of any 
assistance so far as rehabilitation 
physically is concerned? 
A. Of his physical condition, no, but it will permit 
him to pursue education. 
[Deposition of Escobar at 56-57] (emphasis added) 
Another objective of the van is to provide recreation. 
Deposition of Escobar at 63 line 22. 
At the trial, it was stipulated that the deposition of 
Escobar, Camp, Woolsey and Stewart should be received in evidence, 
together with the exhibits to the complaint and affidavits of 
Lorin Miles and Stewart. The effect of the stipulation was to 
allow the trial court to weigh the evidence, rather than be 
restricted by the rules applicable to sununary judgment. (R-322) 
After hearing argument, the trial court ordered that judgment 
enter for defendants, finding as a matter of fact and law 
that the requested equipment was not "medical equipment" as 
provided by the con~ract. (R 131-33) 
-6-
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POINT I 
THE MERE RECOMMENDATION BY A PHYSICIAN OF 
EQUIPMENT FOR A PATIENT DOES NOT MAKE THE 
EQUIPMENT MEDICAL IN NA RE. 
The insurance contract relied upon by the plaintiffs refers 
to "special medical equipment" (in contrast with Kennen v. 
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 59 Misc. 
2d 536, 299 N.YS.2d 880 (1969), which referred to "equipment", 
a broader term than the phrase "medical equipment") • Several 
cases have considered the meaning of the adjective medical in 
the context of services or equipment recommended by a physician. 
The most recent of these, Savaria v. DiSano, 373 A.2d 820 (R.I. 
1977) considered a claim of a disabled employee who sought to be 
provided with an electric wheelchair and an automatic elevator. 
The court sustained the Rhode Island workmen's compensation 
commission's order granting the wheelchair and denying the 
elevator. The employee's physician had remarked with respect 
to the elevator that it would give the employee some change of 
environment and a measure of safety in moving about. On the 
other hand, however, the physician stated that the employee's 
health would not be improved nor his mobility increased. The 
workman's compensation commission reasoned in denying the elevator 
that it would not relieve the effects of the injury but that 
the elevator was rather more a convenience item. In sustaining 
the Workman's compensation Commission the court reasoned, 
-7-
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In short, it is not enough that the means used to 
relieve the employee from the effects of the injury 
have been prescribed by his physician to be chargeable 
to the employer under the statute, they must be medical 
in nature as well •••. In this case ••. the benefit 
is ~ndubitably convenient and perhaps even necessary to 
rel1eve the employee from the effects of his injury 
but there is nothing in this record that compelled the 
commission to conclude that in the circumstances 
described the elevator or lift was medical in nature. 
373 A.2d at 820, 822. [emphasis supplied] 
In a similar case, Lutman v. American Shoe Mach. Co., 151 
S.W.2d 701 (Mo.App. 1941) the question was whether a physician 
had treated the plaintiff for an injury within a period of 
1 
I 
1 imitations. The court held that the doctors recommending to the 
patient that he wear a mask to protect him from dust was not 
medical treatment. The court reasoned as follows: 
As to Dr. Reuter's advice that the respondent be taken 
off the work in question or be given a mask to wear 'if 
the dust was aggravating him', we do not believe it can 
reasonably be said that such advice was 'medical 
treatment.' It is not even suggested that medicine or 
drugs were advised or given by the doctor. It 
certainly was not surgical treatment' or 'hospital 
treatment'. Furthermore the advice was not given to 
cure and relieve the effects of the injury but was for 
the purpose of preventing future aggravation thereof. 
The grouping of the words "medical, surgical and 
hospital treatment" by the legislature shows plainly 
what the lawmakers had in mind and clearly does not 
include mere diagnosis, nor can it be said to include 
advice that could be given by a layman. The above words 
not be1ng of a peculiar or technical nature 'shall be 
taken in their plain and ordinary and usual sense.' 
151 S.W.2d 701, 709 (emphasis added) 
The provision of a automobile vehicle such as a van to the 
plaintiff's son, Jeff, is like the advice given by the doctor 
to the plaintiff Lutman, that Lutman should wear a face mask or' 
-8-
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working around dust. There is no special medical knowledge 
involved in the recommendation in either case1 for Jeff a van is 
certainly a source of independence, convenience, and recreation 
but that is exactly the function that automobiles provide for all 
of us. 
A Texas court considered the question of what is "medical" 
in Red v. Group Medical and Surgical Service, 298 S.W.2d 623 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957). A child who had suffered from spinal 
meningitis was rendered deaf by the disease. The attending 
physician recommended that the child be entered as a student 
at the Houston School for Deaf Children. The plaintiff sought 
to obtain a court order that the matter was covered under a 
clause of the health insurance contract providing for payment 
of fees of "the attending physician and consulting physician and 
specialists to whom the patient may be referred". The court 
rejected the notion that a lip reading instructor was a specialist 
under the contract, stating,--
We do not think that the educational, schooling, or 
training fees paid by plaintiff for teaching his son 
the new skill of lip reading fall within the insuring 
clause of the contract in that even though they be 
classed as professional fees of specialists, the ~olicy 
still does not contemplate fees of other than med~cal 
or surgical specialists--certainly not those of 
educational instructors of any class. 
The court remarked that part of its reasoning was based on the 
finding of the doctor as follows--
The doctor testified that on his examination and 
diagnosis he found the hearing nerves completely 
-9-
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destroyed and that there was nothing he could do from 
a medical standpoint to cure the nerve condition and 
restore the hearing. 
298 S.W.2d 623, 625, 626. 
Dr. Escobar testified that the van recommended for Jeff 
would not improve Jeff's physical condition; rather it would 
serve to aid him in his education and recreation. As in the Red 
case, these objectives are not medical and therefore are not 
comprehended in the phrase "medical equipment". 
POINT II 
THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE INSURANCE CERTIFICATE 
DOES NOT INCLUDE AN AUTOMOBILE OR VAN, NOR 
DOES IT INCLUDE THE SPECIAL EQUIPMENT CLAIMED 
BY PLAINTIFF WITH RESPECT TO THE VAN. 
Considered as an abstract proposition it is clear that an 
automobile or van or bus is not a medical apparatus or device. 
The old definition of "van", which is a contraction of the word 
"caravan," was "an enclosed wagon or motortruck used for 
transportation of goods or animals. " Webster's New Call egiate 
Dictionary 1292 (1975). There is a more recent usage of the 
term "van" referring to a type of vehicle which was recently 
developed for use as a light truck, which is now used for 
personal transportation like an ordinary automobile. Even so 
the ordinarily understood function of a van or of an automobile 
is for transportation, for convenience, perhaps for recreation, 
perhaps for hauling goods, but not for any medical purpose. 
plaintiff in Nallan v. Motion Picture Studio 
-10-
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Mechanic Union Loca.l No. 52, 49 App. Div. 2d 365, 375 NYS 2d 164 
(1975) reversed on other grounds, 40 NY 2d 1042, 360 NE 2d 353 
(1976) sought to receive workmen compensation coverage for his 
transportation expense. The main point in which the case turned 
and which it was ultimately reversed was whether or not he was an 
employee of the union. A subsidiary point was however that the 
plaintiff was not entitled to be provided with an automobile. 
The court reasoned as follows: 
"A motor vehicle is not a medical apparatus or device 
within the scope of Section 13 of the Workmen's 
Compensation Law." 
There are three cases in holding that under New York Workmen's 
Compensation Law an automobile is not a medical apparatus or 
device. Nallan v. Motion Pictures Studio 
Mechanic Union Local No. 52, supra, De Croix v. N. Sumergrade 
& Sons, 20 App. Div. 2d 735, 246 NYS 2d 852; and Carniato v. 
Wheeler Corporation, 7 App. Div. 2d 328, 183 NYS 2d 298. The 
Nallan case has some close analogies to the present case; in it 
the plaintiff was a paraplegic, and using his automobile, he was 
able to be partially active, to hold down a job and so forth. 
Notwithstanding the circumstances, the court rejected his claim 
for the automobile. The reasoning of the two prior cases, 
De Croix and Carniato, was that "the enumeration of medical aids 
expressed in this statutory form would under ordinary canons of 
construction exclude non-medical instruments such as a motor 
vehicle." De croix v. N. Sumergrade & Sons, 20 App. Div. 2d 735 
246 NYS 2d 852, 853, 1964. 
-11-
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The thinking of the New York workmen's compensation cases 
is somewhat like that in the Medicare regulations. The definition 
of medical equipment is given as follows therein: 
D~rable medical equipment is equipment which (1) can 
w~thstand repeated use, (2) is primarily and 
customarily used to serve a medical purpose, (3) 
is enerall not useful to a erson in the absence 
o ~llness or ~nJury, and 4 ~s appropr~ate or use 
in the horne. 
Equipment Presumptively Medical. --Items such 
as wheelchairs and hospital beds are presumptively 
medical in nature . . • • 
Equipment Presumptively Nonmedical. --Equipment 
which is primarily and customarily used for a non-
medical purpose may not be considered "medical" 
equipment for which payment can be made under 
Medicare. This is true even though the item has 
some remote medically related use. For example, in 
the case of a cardiac patient, an air conditioner 
might possibly be used to lower the room temperature 
to reduce fluid loss in the patient and to restore 
an environment conducive to maintenance of the proper 
fluid balance. Nevertheless, because the primary 
and customary use of an air conditioner is a nonmedical 
one, an a~r conditioner cannot be deemed to be medical 
equipment for which payment can be made." 
CCH Medicare and Medicaid Reporter paragraph 3144. 
(emphasis supplied) 
A separate section of the same source mentions the word 
appliances. 
[A]ppliances which customarily serve a nonmedical 
purpose but which may serve a rn~dical purpos~ in a 
specific case . . . may be cons~dered as rned~cal 
appliances only where (l) the physician's plan of 
treatment specifically includes the use of such 
appliances in connection with ~he patient:s treatment 
regimen, and specifies any l~m~tat~ons wh~ch should b~ 
placed on the use of the appliance due to the pat~ent s 
condition, and (2) the appliance may be expected to 
contribute meaningfully to the treatment of the 
-12-
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lon 
ill ness or injury or to improve the functioning of a 
malformed body member. 
CCH Medicare and Medicaid Reporter paragraph 1467. 
(emphasis supplied) 
Dr. Escobar specifically testified that the van will not 
contribute to the treatment of Jeff Camp's malady, insofar as his 
paralysis is concerned, nor will it improve the functioning of 
his disabled members. Deposition of Escobar at 56. 
Under the reasoning of both the New York workmen's compensation 
cases and the Medicare regulations, it appears clear that there 
is no basis for including a van or automobile under the definition 
of medical equipment. Furthermore, the Medicare Regulations 
provide a basis for distinguishing between a wheelchair and an 
automobile. A wheel chair is "generally not useful to a person 
in the absence of illness or injury and ••. is appropriate for 
use in the home • " 
The insurance certificate in this case provides separately 
for certain covered expenses. These are listed as medical 
supplies, ambulance, extended care, and transportation, insofar 
as they are relevant to this case. Plaintiff has the duty to 
show that his claim is covered under one or more of these headings. 
In Urtado v. Allstate Ins. Co., 528 P.2d 222 (Colo. 1974), the 
insured had been driving a car owned by a relative, while the 
definitions in his policy excluded a car owned by a relative 
from its "non-owned" coverage. The court remarked, quoting 
from the opinion in the intermediate appeals court, 
-13-
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Definitions of terms used in the insuring clause 
frequently have the effect of defining, and therefore 
limiting, coverage. 528 P.2d 222, 223. 
The court denied coverage. By setting out several heads of 
insurance coverage, the DMBA policy sets up a scheme defining, 
and in the sense of Ortado, .limiting the coverage. It is not 
enough, to sustain a claim under the policy, to merely point to 
the overall nature of the insurance. For example, in Drumm v. 
Blue Cross of Northeast Ohio, 320 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio l , the 
insured, Patricia, was sent to a special school for "milieu" 
therapy. 
The essential concept of "milieu therapy" is 
that everything that happens to the patient 
has a considerable psychological impact . . • 
This court passes no judgment upon the validity 
or effectiveness of "milieu therapy" but 
because the Plan clearly covers only certain 
enumerated services and supplies, an award of 
the full charge for "milieu therapy" amounts 
to an impermissible judical extension of an 
insurance contract beyond the limits clearly 
established by the policy. Courts are bound 
by the unambiguous terms of an insurance 
contract and cannot enlarge or extend the 
contract by implication so as to embrace an 
object distinct from that originally contemplated 
by the parties. 320 N.E.2d 713, 716. (Emphasis 
added) 
The policy under which Jeff is covered provides transportation 
expense and ambulance expense according to its provisions, and 
the pol icy does not cover the purchase of a motor vehicle for thi 
beneficiary. 
There is another interesting analogy raised by the ~ 
case; in effect, the program of rehabiJitative medicine conducte: 
-14-
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by or. Escobar is a form of "milieu therapy", a treatment aimed 
at the whole personality of Jeff Camp, rather than just his 
paralysis. While the broad scope of this program is admirable, 
it is not insured by the insurance certificate now before the 
court, and to extend coverage to the van simply because the van 
is necessary as a part of this program is not justified by the 
language of the certificate, referring to medical equipment. 
Another contractual provision bears on the treatment of 
the whole man; the certificate provides that custodial care is 
I 
not covered. This raises the implication that "milieu therapy", 
which by its nature extends beyond the acute phase of an illness 
or injury, into the future, is not covered. 
The objective of Dr. Escobar's recommendation of a van, 
that is the education, independence, recreation, and convenience 
of Jeff Camp, is more a question of maintenance than it is of 
acute care. A van is a machine which can replace a chauffeur, 
for example. This is illustrated by Borgmann v. Commissioner, 438 
F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1971). The taxpayer, Borgmann, sought to 
establish that the salary of Mrs. Holtzmann, his housekeeper, was 
deductible medical expense. Her function was to summon aid when 
he was ill and to provide him with housekeeping services, doing 
things for him which may have overtaxed his weak heart. The 
housemaid's function 
[D]id not require the special skills of a nurse or 
one trained in medicine. 
The court also concluded that the housekeeping duties --
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[D]id not bear such a direct and proximate therapeutic 
relation to some physical or mental function or 
structure of the body as to constitute a deductible 
medical expense. 
In Jeff Camp's situation the plaintiff seeks to obtain reimburs~t 
for a C.B. radio, which has the same function as Mrs. Holtzmann 
the housekeeper--to summon aid in an emergency. Other equipment 
to be installed in the vehicle, notwithstanding that it may be 
necessary for Jeff or useful for him, is no more proximately 
related to Jeff's paralysis than was Mrs. Holtzrnann's aid to 
Mr. Borgmann's weak heart, for purposes of determining whether 
these aids are "medical." There is no doubt that the policy 
would not cover the employment of a chauffeur or housekeeper 
for Jeff under the heading of Medical Equipment or under its 
other clauses; machinery purchased for the same purpose is also 
not covered. 
The commonsense idea that transportation equipment is not 
medical, in the understanding of the reasonable man, is illustrat 
by Morris v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 72 N.M. 395, 384 P.2d 
465 (1963). The plaintiff and her daughter were injured while 
covered by a broad automobile medical pol icy which in very gener: 
terms provided for coverage of medical expenses. A relative 
cared for them during part of their recovery, because no hospita: 
was convenient to the office where the mother received her thera: 
1 · d for medl. cal expenses on behal Later a certain amount was c alme 
of the relative. The court reasoned that the policy did not 
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r 
I 
limit coverage to services performed by professionals or in 
institutions such as hospitals; the court disallowed, however, 
a sum requested to reimburse for transporting the daughter to 
school each day because the girl wore a cast on her leg due to 
the accident. The court stated--
"This item is beyond the scope of the policy." 
384 P.2d 465, 469. 
The same reasoning applies to the policy here; transportation, 
whether made necessary by a cast on the leg or paralysis, is not 
a medical concern. Therefore the judgment should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN THE DISPUTED 
PORTION OF THE CERTIFICATE 
In his brief the plaintiff merely documents the existence 
of the dispute over the interpretation of the certificate, which 
does not necessarily establish that the certificate is ambiguous. 
Just because there is a controversy and the parties assert 
differing interpretations, it does not follow that ambiguity has 
been established. O'Meara v. American States Insurance Co., 148 
Ind. App. 56 2 , 2 6 8 N. E. 2d 1 0 9, 11 0. 
Instruments are not rendered ambiguous due to the fact 
that the parties do not now agree upon the proper 
construction to be given them. 
Cole v. Ross Coal Co., 150 F.Supp. 808, 811 (D. W. Va.) · 
The brief of the plaintiff shows that there is actually 
considerable agreement between the parties about the meaning of 
-17-
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l 
I 
the contract. Like all contracts, an insurance policy must be I 
viewed as a whole before it is concluded that there ;s • an arnbiguir 
in the policy. 
There are authoritative statements to the same effect in 
Utah cases. For example, in Fawcett v. Security Benefit Assoc., 
104 P.2d 214 (Utah 1940), the court reasoned, 
Even though a particular provision of a contract 
of insurance be susceptible of more than one meaning 
the construction of such provision more favorable to 
the assured will not be adopted if other provisions 
of the entire contract clearly resolve the ambiguity 
in favor of the contrary construction. 
104 P.2d 214, 218. 
The same principle is supported by Auto Leasing Co •. v. 
Central Mutual Insurance Co., 7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264 (1958) 
where the court was faced with a dispute over whether there was 
coverage of a newly purchased automobile intended to replace a 
covered automobile. The plaintiff argued that there was 
uncertainty in the contract and that therefore the contract 
should be construed in favor of coverage. The court stated 
however, 
But that rule has no application unless there is 
some genuine ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
language upon which reasonable minds may differ 
as to the meaning. That requirement is not 
satisfied because a party may get a different 
meaning by placing a forced or constrained. 
construction on it in accordance with h~s ~nterest. 
The test to be applied is: Would the meaning be 
plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and 
understanding, viewing the matter fairly and 
reasonably, in accordance with usual natural 
meaning of the words, and in the light of 
existing circumstances including the purchase 
of the policy. 
(emphasis supplied) 
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The court held coverage was not available. Similarly, in our case 
the plaintiff is contending that ambiguity is introduced into the 
policy because the injury of the Plaintiff's child is so all 
pervasive that it effects all his daily activities and that 
therefore his need for an automobile is different than that of an 
ordinary citizen for an automobile. Nevertheless, the net result 
of what the plaintiff is contending for would amount to a 
revision of the contract and would provide for coverage of 
transportation costs by means other than those provided in the 
contract. 
Another case involving interpretation of an insurance 
contract was Marriott v. Pacific National Life Insurance Co., 24 
Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 981 (1970) in which the court reasoned that 
before the contract could be interpreted, all of the language 
must be construed together and that in view of that reasoning the 
court rejected plaintiff's contention, that the death of the 
plaintiff's decedent implied that the plaintiff's decedent was 
"disabled" for the purposes of certain insurance. As a matter of 
interpretation, each clause of the contract lends meaning to the 
others. A term is not ambiguous if fair inferences from other 
parts give meaning to the questioned part. Fawcett v. Security 
Benefit Association, supra. 
It is to be noted that a liberal interpretation of an 
i~surance policy or contract does not necessarily imply that all 
doubts are to be resolved against the insurance company. 
-19-
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To take the ordinary and obvious meaning of words 
~nd construe them in the light of surrounding facts 
1 
~s the fundamental rule of construction. When that 
fails, other so called rules which might be better 
be called expedients may be resorted to. 
National 0 tical Co. v. United States Fidelit 
an Guarantee Company, 235 P. 43 Colo. 1925). 
In construing a contract a court should look to the intentio: 
of the parties and take the point of view of the average man. 
Handley v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 106 Utah 184, 
14 7 p • 2d 31 9 • 
In view of the foregoing authorities the insurance certifica~ 
in issue in this case is not ambiguous. The word "medical" as 
it is commonly understood does not include automobiles or other 
automotive vehicles such as vans. This common acceptation of 
the phrase "medical equipment" therefore implies that there is 
no dispute as to the interpretation of the phrase "medical 
equipment" which would detain reasonable men. 
Furthermore, the objectives of the doctor in prescribing 
the van is not within those objectives covered by the policy. 
The insurance is for health, not for the independence or 
recreation of the insured. The court should not, of course, 
rewrite the policy to reach these uninsured objectives. The cas< 
of cotton States Insurance Co. of Atlanta, Georgia v. 
Diamond Housing Mobile Homes, 430 F. Supp 503 (Dis. of Ala. 
1977) held that the scope of an exclusionary provision must be 
determined in light of the entire insurance policy. A rule 
requiring the interpretation of ambiguity in the favor of the 
t " t. perversion of the policv's lang~~ insured does no sane lOn a k - • 
-20-
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Defendants contend that plaintiff's interpretation of the 
insurance policy is not based on sound principles. A review of 
the entire policy shows that transportation and custodial care 
expenses which are a substantial aspect of the van's purpose are 
covered by other portions of the policy in a manner which would 
not provide coverage for the expense of the van. The provision 
of a van is not a question of substituting for lost function of 
the body of Jeff Camp. Nobody ambulates or gets around naturally 
by van. The objective for providing for ambulation by wheelchair 
is a covered expense but the objective of providing a van is not. 
A reading of the insurance policy shows that it was never 
intended by the parties to provide coverage in a form now claimed 
by the plaintiff. It is not the function of the court to rewrite 
the policy or torture the meaning of the policy to extend such 
coverage at this time. Torrington Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co. , 21 6 S . E . 2 d 54 7 ( S . C . 1 9 7 5) • 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT HIS 
CLAIM IS WITHIN THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS 
OF THE CERTIFICATE AND THEREFORE HIS 
SUIT SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
The duty of the plaintiff in an insurance case is to show 
that his claim fails within the express provisions of the policy. 
First ~ational Bank v. Maryland Casualty Co., 162 Cal. 61, 121 P. 
321. This plaintiff has attempted to do by arguing a number of 
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cases. The first, Amicone v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 19 Utah 2d ! 
297, 431 P.2d 130 (1967) is cited by plaintiff for the idea th~ 
DMBA, the defendant, is bound by the opinion of the insured's 
doctor. DMBA contends here, however, that the expense must be 
(1) one which is medically related and ( 2) one which is prescribe( 
by a doctor, and that these two requirements are independent is 
shown by Point I of this memo. There is no provision in the 
Deseret Mutual Contract, as there was in Amicone, for the decisio: 
of any doctor to be binding and therefore Amicone is not applicab. 
to this situation. 
Plaintiff's second point is to merely set forth the general 
proposition that insurance policies are construed, when ambiguity 
exists, in favor of the insured. Defendants contend that there 
is no ambiguity in this policy, that its plain language clearly 
excludes this claim of the plaintiff. Therefore, the principle 
that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the insured has 
no application here. Furthermore, the finding of the DMBA claill: 
cornmi ttee that the claim for the van was for transportation exper:; 
is clearly correct. 
The case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Jacober, 10 Cal. 3d 193, 514 p.2d 953 (1973) is merely cumulative 
authority on the principle that the contract ought to be 
interpreted in favor of the insured where ambiguity exists. 
Furthermore, Jacober concerned a contract which involved the 
interpretation of an exclusion clause. The issue in this case 
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is not exclusion, but rather the definition of the insurance. 
The plaintiff makes a causation argument to define the word 
"medical". In effect, the definition of "medical" is "anything 
required by reason of the impairment of a person," as follows: 
Jeff is paralyzed, therefore, he needs a van to get around and 
therefore the van is a necessary consequence of his impairment, 
and is "medical". The mistake in this argument is that it is 
too all-inclusive. All people need to be independent, all people 
need recreation and all people of Jeff's age need to travel to 
school and for these purposes it is convenient for them to have 
an automobile or a van. The plaintiff's son, Jeff, wants an 
automobile or the doctor recommended an automobile for him for 
the same reasons that anyone would buy an automobile, that is, 
for convenience to get around, to be independent, to enjoy 
recreation, and so forth. These purposes, however, are not 
medical when they are considered with respect to everyone else, 
all the normal members of the community, and they are not medical 
with respect to Jeff. The van will lessen Jeff's dependence upon 
the kind of services normally classed as custodial care, that is, 
lifting him in and out of vehicles, chauffeuring him around, 
calling for help in emergencies, and so forth. These are not 
covered under the contract, however. It is an oversimplification 
to say that because Jeff finds a van convenient and because it 
reduces the impact upon his life of his impairment that the van 
is therefore medical. 
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It should also be mentioned that in Fassio v. Montana 
Physicians Service, 553, P.2d 998 (Mont. 1976) the question 
was whether the defendant should pay for certain services of a 
physician which were condemned by the medical community as 
experimental. The dispute, in effect, in Fassio was between good 
and bad medicine. The question was not whether it was medical 
or not, but whether it was good medicine. Thus the Fassio case 
does not speak to the main issue of this case, to wit, whether 
or not an automobile can be considered as an item of medical 
expense. 
CONCLUSION 
The following points should be emphasized: (l) plaintiff 
supplied the motive and impetus for preparing the doctor's 
recommendation of the van in a form which, when submitted to the 
insurance company, would 1 ook like a prescription; ( 2) The Plair.: 
has failed to argue, in his brief, that the function of the vu, 
as it is to be used by Jeff, is medical rather than recreationaL 
educational or social; (3) Defendant DMBA contends that a van is 
not medical, and it has formulated its rates on the supposition 
that a van is not covered; to hold otherwise would open the doer 
to many similar articles and would injure the company in its ea 
to hold the line against higher prices and premiums; and (4) 
Plaintiff has failed to cite any direct authority supporting hl! 
claim. 
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Dr. Escobar stated, on page 58 of his deposition, that the 
only contact he had with plaintiff had to do with the preparation 
of an insurance claim. 
Q. (Mr. Bushnell) Primarily, then, that was one 
conversation when Mr. Camp carne to you alone, 
gave you a sheet of paper with some items on 
it and said, "I would like to have this 
letter to present to the insurance company 
and I would like you to specify what is the 
best equipment available for use for my son 
considering his condition? 
A. (Dr. Escobar) Yes, Sir. 
At the deposition of Jim Woolsey, Jeff's social worker, 
testimony was given confirming that plaintiff gave the impetus 
for preparing the requisition for the van in a form to be 
submitted to the insurance carrier. 
Q. (Mr. Bushnell) No, Mr. Camp in his discussions, 
had he said, "If this can qualify as medical 
equipment, that means it is probably covered. 
If I could get a requisition to present to the 
insurance company I can get them to review it." 
Anything like that? 
A. (Mr. Woolsey) Yes . 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
So is it correct to summarize your testimony that 
the requisition was made at the request of Mr. 
Camp to present to the insurance company to see 
whether they would or would not approve it; is 
that right. 
Well, that is true throughout the consultations 
with the doctor. 
But he indicated that he wanted you to requisition, 
he wanted the staff, the department, the doctor, 
to recommend the van as being the best equipment 
for his son? 
Right . 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Did you have more than one discussion with Mr. Camp 
about this? 
Yes. Like I mentioned before, it seemed like we 
had several conversations, you know, getting close 
to the time of discharge, "What are all of the 
things that Jeff would be needing so he could 
pursue his life," transportation being a great 
necessity for Jeff to continue with, you know, 
pursuing school, that kind of thing. 
You said several conversations? 
Yes 
Would you say that is three, four ... or what? 
Half a dozen. 
And would most of these have taken place prior to 
the preparing of the document previously mentioned? 
Yes. 
And in those you had specific discussions about 
the van on more than one occasion? 
Yes. 
Then did you talk to the doctor on more than one 
occasion about the van? 
Yes. 
How many times would you say you talked to the 
doctor about it? 
I would say maybe three or four times. 
[Deposition of Woolsey at 32-34 .] (Emphasis supplied) 
Earlier in this memorandum defendants set out the language 
of the plaintiff when he was asked about the preparation of t~ 
prescription of the van--
Q. [Mr. Bushnell] Is it fair, based upon what you've said, to say then that you initiated 
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to the doctor for 
so you cou d present 
A. (Mr. Camp) Prescribing all the equipment, the is 
yes. 
Q. Including the van? 
A. Including the van. 
Ibeposition of Camp at 18] (Emphasis supplied) 
The foregoing testimony shows, therefore, that the prescription 
prepared by Dr. Escobar was motivated by plaintiff's request for 
it, in order to test the insurance policy, rather than exclusively 
by the doctor's judgment as to whether the van was medical. The 
doctor testified, of course, that the function of the van was 
for transportation, for education, for recreation--but not for 
the medical needs of Jeff. The van, according to the doctor, is 
not a treatment of any physical condition of Jeff's, nor is it, 
like a wheelchair, helpful for Jeff to get around the house and 
take care of his body functions, going to the bathroom, eating, 
having a shower, and the like. It is for transportation, and 
that is why plaintiff's claim was denied by DMBA. 
The rates of DMBA health coverage are set based upon 
anticipated payments on behalf of members. In setting these 
rates, the company must consider its experience, the scope of the 
coverage, and trends in health care prices. It is common 
knowledge that such prices are now rising rapidly. The premiums 
',vhich have been in force have been based upon the assumption that 
items like automobiles and other transportation equipment are not 
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covered as "medical equipment". If the court were to order the 
company to pay the claim in this case, the result would be an 
upset of these calculations and loss to the company resulting in 
increased premiums to members. The risk is particularly great 
because of the amount of expense involved in a van costing 
$10,000.00, or perhaps for the rental of an air-conditioned 
apartment needed by a patient to provide him with "independence," 
or to buy a patient a typewriter or even stenographic services, 
to help him with his education, or perhaps to buy him a specially· 
equipped snowmobile, to help with recreation. The conclusion 
is that a motor vehicle, not being medical in nature, is not 
covered. 
Plaintiff's argument is limited in scope. Not having any 
authority, apparently, for the proposition that a motor vehicle 
is medical in nature, he argues that it is logical to consider a 
van as medical. The law, however, proceeds on a different 
principle. As Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court 
once wrote, "A page of experience is worth a volume of logic." 
Plaintiff's argument shows no experience, no authority. Pl ainti: 
relies on the serious injury Jeff has suffered, and its all-
pervasive effects on his life, to transmute in the court's mind 
an ordinary motor vehicle, useful for transportation, into rnedk 
equipment. This court should resist such arguments and affi~ 
the judgment of. Elton v. Bankers Life & Casual tv Co. I 30 utah 
2d 213, 516 P.2d 165 (1973) (Court dismissed claim of widow 
of judge that heart disease and stroke were covered under 
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accidental death policy). 
KIRTON, McCONKIE, BOYER AND BOYLE 
1 
, :J1z, [ c.c ,):, L~( ~ / 
Bruce Fl.ndlay 
;/...._ 
SERVED a copy of the foregoing brief by mail this ~ day 
~f June, 1978, to the offices of Thomas T. Billings, Esq., 79 South 
State, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
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